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Abstract 
The Strategy for Homeland Security stresses the need for a robust public health 
component to respond to and recover from a range of emergencies.   However, the dire 
problems with the current public health manpower infrastructure have been reported for 
over 15 years and continue to be a problem.  Bioterrorism funding can not be used to 
rectify manpower issues since it is temporary.  We focus on Union County, New Jersey 
to determine baseline staffing requirements to complete public health and bioterrorism 
mandates.  Optimistically, Union County is staffed at 68% of the needed manpower to 
fulfill either state/ federal health objectives or bio preparedness functions.  While specific 
to Union County, the framework is applicable to other counties and states in their own 
assessments.  It is imperative that the capacity of the public health infrastructure is 
increased as a Homeland Security priority.  Federal and state spending priorities must be 
re-aligned for public health to become a partner in the mission of Homeland Security.  
INTRODUCTION 
The role of public health at the national, federal, state and local level has become an 
important component of The Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  Homeland 
Security has elevated public health personnel to first responder status.  However, public 
health has not received sustained funding to address the new directives and tasks it has 
been mandated to perform.  Congress passed two landmark bills, the Public Health 
Threats and Emergencies Act of 2000 (PL-106-505), and the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Act of 2002 (PL-107-288), that directed approximately $99 million to 
rebuilding public health capacities.1  While the additional funding was helpful in 
beginning bioterrorism planning, the funds were only temporary.  Therefore, they could 
only address changes in tools, hardware, communications, and similar items but not 
address fundamental personnel issues.  The basic assumption is that public health is an 
optimal system that simply needs to be refocused and aimed in new directions. This 
ignores the fact that public health agencies have not been a high priority for decades.  As 
state and local budgets are squeezed, public health is one of the first agencies to face cuts, 
leaving most health agencies barely staffed to operate during a normal workday.2  
Questions arise whether public health departments have the requisite manpower to 
perform the duties required of them. 
There is a peculiar unwillingness to address or examine fully the manpower 
problems facing public health.  It is not as though federal and state governments are 
unaware of these issues or that they are recent developments. 3   The problems and perils 
associated with the current state of the public health infrastructure has been the subject of 
many reports and publications for well over 15 years. A 1988 report by the Institutes of 
Medicine (IOM) entitled The Future of Public Health, the IOM warned of the 
deteriorating public health workforce.4   In their follow up report in 2002, they felt that 
little improvement had been made since the first report.5  In 2001, the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) prepared a Status Report, Public Health’s Infrastructure:  
Every Health Department Fully Prepared; Every Community Better Protected revealing 
to a Congressional appropriations committee that the public health community was still 
structurally weak in nearly every area and there were critical gaps in workforce capacity 
and competency. 6  Other studies conducted by prominent public health associations; 
National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) and the 
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) supported these findings.  
In October 2001, NACCHO conducted a nationwide study that highlighted current 
infrastructure deficiencies by identifying the workforce duties and compositions of local 
health agencies.  However, there was no effort to determine the optimal workforce 
staffing level needed to accomplish the government public health mission.  In 2004, 
ASTHO published a report in which it found that the lack of public health workers is a 
crisis for national public health preparedness.7 
These manpower issues have taken on a new urgency since September 11, 2001 
and the subsequent anthrax attacks.  In a 2003 study analyzing the response to the World 
Trade Center attack, Klitzman and Freudenberg concluded that planning has limits and it 
is vital to maintain a robust public health infrastructure that has reserve capacity beyond 
routine functioning.8  This conclusion is all the more worrisome as it has been shown that 
public health is frequently not staffed for even routine functioning.  There is a 
fundamental mismatch between expectations placed on public health and the system’s 
ability to respond. 
Public health workforce studies reveal infrastructure shortages being created by 
budgetary neglect and an aging workforce nearing retirement. Local health agencies 
(LHAs) have been hit hard because of an aging workforce with up to 45% of staff 
approaching retirement, vacancy rates as high as 20%, and employee turnover rates as 
high as 14%.9  The closest attempt to quantify the extent of the workforce shortage was a 
2004 study titled The Public Health Workforce by Tilson and Gebbie who described the 
scope and content of work done by the (public health) workforce in the field.10  This 
report identified the need to gain hard evidence to formulate a rational public health 
policy.   
It is essential that stakeholders become aware of the actual, rather then the 
perceived, day-to-day functions of public health.  In addition to the workload required to 
meet basic public health mandates, it is also necessary to assess the impact of the 
bioterrorism mandates in the daily functioning of LHAs. The key to improving the public 
health infrastructure lies in developing an empirical method to objectively determine 
workforce requirements. Without a clear idea of what resources are needed we will not be 
able to develop a realistic, defensible funding target.  Currently, there are no studies that 
provide staffing estimates for a population based infrastructure that is able to meet the 
public health and bioterrorism mandates.  This paper focuses on one example, Union 
County, New Jersey (NJ) and assesses the many activities that public health agencies are 
expected to perform and employs a manpower matrix to determine baseline staffing 
requirements for local public health departments.  While specific to Union County, New 
Jersey, the framework used to estimate manpower requirements will be applicable to 
other counties and states in their own assessment of local public health infrastructures.  
Investments in the public health infrastructure serve a dual purpose: improving the 
delivery of health services at the local level and improving the response capability of 
public health as a partner with other first responders. 
UNION COUNTY, NEW JERSEY 
Union County has a population of 522,541 individuals in 100 square miles. Union 
County is home to the Elizabeth Port (a critical part of the port of New York/New 
Jersey); major railroads and highways including the New Jersey Transit Railroad System, 
the New Jersey Turnpike, and the Garden State Parkway; and the Newark International 
Airport. Surrounding the county is the East Coast’s largest Petroleum Port, the largest 
Auto Port and Newark, the largest city in New Jersey and a major international airport 
hub.  There are several languages other than English that are native to Union County 
residents, including Spanish, Polish, Russian, Creole, Italian and Portuguese. It is 
assumed that there is a significant undocumented foreign population living within the 
community.  The significance of this is to illustrate the rich critical infrastructure and 
opportunities for potential exposure to natural or man made biological threats.  Table 1 
provides base year 2000 Census information in Union County.11  Almost 14% of the 
population is over age 65.  Approximately 8.4% of the population lives below 200% of 
the poverty guideline ($31,340).  The Union County demographics in Table 1 are used to 
calculate the target segments of the population for specific public health services.  This is 
the basis for the workload calculations.   
 
Table 1:  Demographics1 of Union County, New Jersey (2000 Census) 
     Total Population  522,541 
 N 
N < 200% 
of Poverty2 
Sex   
     Male 251,372 30,165
     Female 271,169 32,540
 
Reportable LHER3 Categories 
by Age and Gender   
     Children < 5 years of age 18,702 2,244
     Children < 2 years of age 14,576 1,749
     Teenagers 15 - 19 years of age 31,451 3,774
     Females 15 - 64 years of age 173,727 20,847
     Females < 20 years of age 35,776 4,293
     Females > 40 years of age 145,235 17,428
     Males > 40 years of age 146,893 17,627
     Adults 22 - 61 years of age 285,766 34,292
     Adults > 40 years of age 146,893 17,627
     Adults > 50 years of age 212,651 25,518
     Adults > 65 years of age 117,976 14,157
 
Notes:  
1 Numbers derived from the Union County, New Jersey 2000 Census 
2 < 200% of defined as households earning < $31,340 annually as per the Department of 
Health and Human Services Guidelines. Reporting poverty distribution demonstrates 
focus of public health resources by neediest population. 
3 LHER: Local Health Evaluation Report.  Data were derived from the 2004 LHER 
Reports.   
 
There are significant manpower issues in public health in Union County and in 
New Jersey in general.  For Union County’s population of 522,541, there are only 47 
public health employees within ten local health departments.  This represents a ratio of 9 
public health workers per 100,000 populations.  Nationally, the ratio of public health 
workers was 158 per 100,000 in 2,000.12  Based on this statistic, Union County is well 
below the national average in the public health workforce. 
A graphic example of the workload dilemma was witnessed in April 2005 when 
New Jersey hosted the congressionally-mandated international terrorism exercise known 
as TOPOFF3 (T3).  T3 was designed to identify vulnerabilities in the State of New Jersey 
by exercising the plans, policies, procedures, systems and facilities of federal, state, and 
county/local response organizations against a biological attack.  The scenario was a 
bioterrorist attack using pneumonic plague as the agent.  Officially, the public health 
agencies met the expectations of the week long exercise.  However, in reality, the 
manpower needs were filled by mobilizing “notional” resources, interpreted as using 
imaginary public health workers to meet the expectations of the exercise.  One 
epidemiologist was expected to conduct case contact disease investigations for more than 
19,000 victims and participate in all public health/law enforcement responses.  Clearly 
more manpower was needed.  In addition, the LINCS agency (a division of the county-
wide public health team) was responsible for opening points of distribution (PODS) to 
provide mass prophylaxis for the entire county.  Using a pharmaceutical distribution-
staffing model developed by the Weil/Cornell Medical School, the Bioterrorism and 
Epidemic Outbreak Response Model (BERM),13 we can predict staffing needs for Points 
of Distribution (POD) to provide prophylaxis for Union County.  For example, using a 
smallpox scenario with an incubation period of thirteen days, and assuming that it takes 
three days to diagnose the primary outbreak, that leaves ten days to immunize 522,541 
residents to mitigate the secondary outbreak.  Part of the NJ health mandates are that 
LHAs can administer vaccine to all known or suspect contacts of cases within 3 days; and 
if necessary to vaccinate their entire jurisdiction with in 10 days.14  Entering the Union 
County workforce of 47 people into the program we find that we will need 197 days to 
immunize the entire population.  If we are to meet the ten day target, based on the model 
and using an optimistic clinic flow rate of 120 residents per hour, BERM tells us that we 
need a staff 1,232 a day of people to accomplish the task.  The Public Health Workforce 
Enumeration 2000 credits New Jersey with a local public health workforce of 2,244 
people.  Union County would need 55% of the total local public health workforce in the 
state to meet the target timetable.  There are 20 other counties in NJ that would be facing 
similar manpower shortfalls.  Clearly, this is an overwhelming task that no agency within 
NJ is equipped to accomplish.  The predicament remains the same for any infectious 
outbreak, be it pandemic influence, bird flu, or a bioterrorist attack.  When the response is 
in the face of a real epidemic and no longer a practice exercises, it will become necessary 
to find thousands of real people to staff the “notional” positions used during the 
exercises.  There are no guidelines or plans for finding these people or training them to 
do the required tasks.  Further complicating the issue is that within the next five years 
shortages due to retirement age will also impact the workforce.  In point of fact, NJ does 
not have enough manpower to meet its needs as demonstrated by the exercise, but 
officials ignore this lesson.  
When letters laced with powdered anthrax spores were intentionally sent through 
the postal system, the New Jersey public health system and its capacity to respond to an 
act of terrorism was significantly challenged. Overnight the New Jersey State Department 
of Health and Senior Services (NJDHSS) and the New Jersey State Police laboratories 
were overwhelmed with white powder samples needing identification.  Issues such as 
chain of custody, epidemiological investigation and mass prophylaxis needed to be 
addressed.  In response to this crisis, New Jersey enhanced its laboratory capabilities by 
adding a new bio-level 3 laboratory.  The hope of this study is that the public health 
manpower infrastructure can be improved before the advent of the next major health 
crisis. 
The New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services (NJDHSS) sets policy 
and standards for statewide public health programs; regulates and licenses health care 
facilities, practitioners and public health professionals; maintains a bio level three 
laboratory; administers various grants for public health programs; and collects and 
analyzes communicable disease data. In New Jersey, a local health agency (LHA) is 
defined as a county, regional, municipal or other governmental agency organized for the 
purpose of providing health services, administered by a full-time health officer and 
conducting a public health program pursuant to law.15  Public health services are 
provided almost exclusively at the local level, yet 55% of the entire New Jersey public 
health workforce is employed by the NJDHSS.16  
NJ LHAs are established by state statute and local ordinance and operate under a 
“Home Rule” format, which grants municipalities’ partial autonomy of self government.  
One problem with home rule is that local health agencies serve population bases that are 
too small to financially support the level of service required by federal and state 
mandates.  To solve this problem, many agencies resort to contracted labor, part time 
positions or employees being utilized in a dual role capacity.  The result is a pool of 
public health personnel being shared by multiple agencies or across disciplines. This 
works passably when there is no undue stress on the system but is easily and quickly 
overwhelmed with even small scale events.  In an emergency, part time employees will 
be expected to discharge full time duties in more than one municipality, simultaneously. 
In 1997, New Jersey was awarded approximately $16 million to enhance the 
public health infrastructure at the local level for bioterrorism preparedness.  Twenty-two 
Local Information Network Communication System (LINCS) public health agencies 
were strategically positioned throughout the state.  LINCS started as a simple email 
system and has evolved into the “lead public health agency” 17  in every county 
throughout the state.  This evolution occurred without considering the existing legal 
structure and authority of LINCS employees within their counties.  Today, the goal and 
vision of LINCS is to facilitate a regional response by enhancing the public health 
infrastructure while also being asked to fill in the gaps of providing essential health 
services.18   
The new response structures, established with the creation of LINCS, duplicated 
and complicated an existing public health communication system. Public health 
communications must flow to and from a newly established health command center 
(HCC) instead of the traditional New Jersey Office of Emergency Management 
(NJOEM).  The HCC creates a parallel public health silo alongside NJOEM.  Further 
complicating this issue is another NJDHSS creation, the regional Medical Coordinating 
Center (MCC).  At this point, it is unclear what role the MCC’s will play.  However, they 
are worrisome as responders now must repeat messages three times to assure that 
information reaches all required receptors.  How the system will respond to contradictory 
commands remains to be seen. 
In New Jersey there are two significant public health mandates that provide LHAs 
operational direction when enforcing or reporting progress in public health within their 
jurisdictions.  These mandates are known as:  1) Local Core Capacity for Bioterrorism 
Preparedness Grant (also called Attachment C) and 2) Public Health Practice Standards 
for Local Boards of Health (also called Practice Standards).  To conduct the manpower 
analysis to determine the minimum staffing level required by the bioterrorism 
preparedness goals stated in the bioterrorism grant and the public health mandates of the 
NJDHSS, a state-sanctioned manpower formula, the NJSDHSS formula “Estimating 
Registered Environmental Health Staffing Needs for Local Health Departments”19 was 
used.  This tool was originally developed to determine the number of staff required to 
fulfill the workload for the registered environmental health staff.  However, its 
modification for use with the other core positions is straightforward.  The four core 
public health positions examined in this paper are:   
1. Public Health Nurse- a licensed professional position that conducts the 
personal health programs of the LHA 
2. Health Educator- Certified Health Educator Specialist (CHES)- conducts 
health education programs designed to encourage lifestyle modifications 
that will eliminate or reduce risk factors of chronic diseases  
3. Registered Environmental Health Specialist (REHS) - a licensed 
professional position that conducts the environmental program including 
investigations and enforcement of applicable laws and statutes  
4. Epidemiologist (EPI) - investigates reportable disease cases and conduct 
infectious disease surveillance 
The staffing level required to fulfill the mandates are compared to the actual staffing level 
with Union County, including all the LHAs and the LINCs agency operating within the 
county.   
TRADITIONAL EXPECTATIONS OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
Public health is the provider of last resort for an array of health services for people 
without financial resources or health insurance.20 Public Health services that are 
performed by private practitioners or hospitals are expected to be reimbursed by 
insurance and therefore they reach those at or above 200% of the poverty level.  Although 
acute medical care for the indigent is available through hospital emergency rooms and 
other health clinics, non-emergency, non-acute preventive services for the medically 
indigent remains almost exclusively the responsibility of the LHA.  
Public Health Practice Standards of Performance for Local Boards of Health, 
promulgated by the NJDHSS, Division of Local Health and Emergency Services were 
adopted by the state Public Health Council as the model system to provide local public 
health activities.  The standards are intended to “assure the provision of a modern and 
manageable array of public health services to all citizens of New Jersey”21 and are 
enforced by the LHAs. Each of the core staff positions has corresponding responsibilities 
enumerated in the Practice Standards; these mandates are imposed on every LHA 
regardless of population base or staffing levels. The core component of the Practice 
Standards includes disease screening, vaccinations, disease monitoring, inspections (food 
establishments, pools, camps, etc.), educational classes and other disease prevention 
activities, as well as performance monitoring and evaluation of local programming and 
services.  LHAs are expected to conduct community surveys, health risk assessments, and 
resource inventories as well as form public health partnerships with outside agencies and 
disciplines. 
To assess the workload associated with these Practice Standards in Union County, 
the first step was to determine the population that will be served by the LHAs.  We used a 
conservative approach and limited population served to individuals living below the 
200% poverty line.  Families above the 200% of poverty guideline will be more likely to 
have health insurance or have regular access to health care and are therefore less likely to 
need or utilize public health clinics.  This calculation represents a lower limit on services 
requested since some services, such as cervical cancer screening services, are well 
established and accepted by individuals of all income categories.  In addition, although 
the 200% poverty guideline was also employed in the Older Adult Health Services target 
estimates, seniors of all income categories typically utilize these services.  These 
calculations underestimate the actual level of need, however, this serves to bias against 
the hypothesis proposed in this research. 
Once the target population size was determined, the target activities were 
calculated using the Adult Health Services Guidelines, published by NJDHSS.22  These 
guidelines are performance objectives and provide detailed targets for public health 
services.  For example, the cancer education targets are 5% of women aged 15-64 for 
breast cancer and 3% of both sexes for colo-rectal cancer; 85% of children under 2 years 
of age are targeted for screening for lead poisoning.  The guidelines form the basis of the 
Local Health Evaluation Report (LHER) that each LHA must submit to NJDHSS every 
year.  The LHER is a very detailed assessment of a number of core tasks which form the 
basis of the Practice Standards.  Tables 2 through 5 through shows the workload for the 
epidemiologist, the Health Educator/Risk Communicator (HERC), the Public Health 
Nurse, and Registered Environmental Health  Specialist (REHS) positions. 
When the delivered services as reported in the LHER are compared to the targeted 
services as specified by the Practice Standards, there are numerous gaps that become 
apparent, especially in health education and public health nursing (data available from the 
corresponding author).  To quantify the manpower needs to conduct the minimum service 
levels identified by NJDHSS, we apply the formula on the State Health Department web 
site that enables health officers and Board of Health members to estimate the Registered 
Environmental Health Specialist manpower needs.23  As detailed in the Appendix, we 
estimate an annual work year of 983 hours for REHS and 1,313 hours for the remaining 
core positions.  These two numbers differ because travel is a significant portion of the 
REHS workday, where the other positions have limited expected travel time.  Dividing 
the number of hours needed to meet target performance levels by the hours per 
manpower-year, we can determine the optimal manpower level for each position.  Tables 
2 through 5 show the estimated manpower needs the by core public health positions to 
comply with the NJ Public Health Practice Standards. 
Table 2 details the results of the manpower estimates for the epidemiologist 
position.  There are no local epidemiologists in the LHAs. There is only one 
epidemiologist employed and assigned to Union County LINCS.  Therefore, all 
investigations were conducted by staff other than an epidemiologist.  Table 3 shows the 
results of the manpower estimates for the health education position.  Using the LHER 
reported number of clients served, divided by the number of health education sessions 
conducted, yields a result of 15 clients per session.  The number of sessions conducted 
divided by the available health education man-hours yields a time frame of 6.3 hours per 
session.  Based on experience, this is a reasonable figure to use for planning purposes 
when class preparation time, class time, outreach, follow-up and reporting are considered 
as components making up one session.  Health education population targets are based on 
Adult Health Services Guidelines, divided by 15 clients per session, multiplied by 6.3 
hours per session.  This result, divided by 1,313 work hours per year, yields the estimated 
number of Health Educators needed to reach objectives. 
Table 4 details the results of the manpower estimates for the public health nurse.  
Each of the required activities is assigned an hourly rate that is derived from LHA 
experience.  These time estimates are multiplied by the target population number and 
then divided by 1,313 hours to arrive at the full time equivalent manpower estimate.  
Table 5 shows the manpower estimates for the Registered Environmental Health 
Specialist (REHS).  Manpower estimates are obtained by following the same procedure 
as in Table 4.  It is interesting to note that a general rule of thumb calls for one Registered 
Environmental Health Specialist per population of 15,000.24  Using this ratio would result 
in a more serious staff deficiency. 
The manpower estimates for the four core positions and reveals the need for three 
epidemiologists, three Health Educators, seven public health nurses and ten REHS to  
Table 2.  Epidemiology Manpower Requirements for Practice Standards 
Compliance 
 
   
Hours per 
Disease 
Report 1 LHER2 
Hours per 
Activity 
Target Activity     
 
Reportable Disease 
Investigation    
  Cases 0.33  2,106 695 
  Follow-Up  2 966 1,932 
Communicable 
Diseases     
 
Sexually Transmitted 
Diseases (STD)    
  Cases 1 539 539 
  Follow-Up  1 539 539 
 Tuberculosis (TB)    
  Cases 0.33 64 21 
  Follow-up  1 141 141 
Annual Required 
Workload Hours 
    3,867 
Annual Hours Available3 
per Epidemiologist 
       1,3133 
Epidemiologists Required 
to Complete Workload 
Hours (N)   
            
                      
3 
Available Epidemiologists 
(N)     
    0 
Manpower Deficit 
Epidemiologists (N)            3 
Notes: 
1 0.33 hours (or 20 minutes) is based on local health experience 
2 As no targets are available, actual workload in terms of cases and follow-up were 
obtained from the Local Health Evaluation Report forms  
3 Available work hours formula as explained in detail in the Appendix  
 
 
comply with New Jersey Practice Standards.  These estimates would significantly 
increase the public health workforce in the county and yet they would still be well below 
 Table 3. Health Education/Risk Communications (HERC) Manpower 
Requirements for Practice Standards Compliance 
 










Alcohol: Target 56.5% of adult 
population between 22-61 years of age 6.3 538 3,389 
 
Smoking: Target 20% of adult 
population between 22-61 years of age 6.3 191 1,203 
 
Physical Fitness: Target 22% of adult 
population between 22-61 years of age 6.3 210 1,323 
 
Drug Abuse: Target 36% of teenage 
population between 15-18 years of age 6.3 38 239 
 
Annual Required Workload Hours   6,155 
 
Annual Hours Available3 
per HERC      1,313 
 
HERC’s Required to Complete 
Workload Hours (N)      5 
Available HERC’s (N)       2 
 




1 6.3 hours per unit is based on local health agency experience with conducting programs 
2 Target numbers based divide hours/category by hours/unit 
3 Hours calculated by multiplying hours/unit by target sessions 
 
 
the national average of 158 per one hundred thousand residents.  The current manpower 
estimate is limited by restricting targeting to residents living at 200% of poverty or less.  
If the income restriction is removed, the manpower deficit would increase dramatically. 











Maternal and Child Health  
Maternal and Child Health 
Clinics: Those at ≤ 200% poverty 0.75 2,244 1,683 
 
Lead Screening: 85% ≥ 2 years 
of age and those at ≤ 200% 
poverty 0.40 1,487 595 
 
Improved Pregnancy Outcome 
(IPO): Females ≤ 20 years of age 
receiving prenatal and post 
partum visits and those at ≤ 
200% poverty 2.25 482 1,085 
Childhood Immunizations: Those 
at ≤ 200% poverty 0.40 2,244 898 
Cancer Screening and Education  
Cervical/Breast Cancer 
Screening: 3% of females 15-64 
years of age 0.45 625 281 
Prostate Cancer Screening: 5% 
of males ≥ 40 years and thse at ≤ 
200% poverty 0.54 881 476 
Mammography: 50% of females 
≥ 40 years and those at ≤ 200% 
poverty 1.10 8,714 9,585 
Cancer Education 0.40 10,221 4,088 
Adult Health and Diabetes  
Diabetes Screening: 1% of adults 
≥ 50 years  0.40 2,127 851 
Diabetes Education 0.40 2,127 851 
Adult Health and Cardiovascular Disease 
Cardiovascular Disease 
Screenings: 1% of adults ≥ 50 











Education 0.40 2,764 1,106 
Older Adult Services: ≥ 65 Years of Age 
 
Influenza and Pneumonia 
Vaccinations: 20% of Older 
Adults 0.75 16,989 12,742 
 
Health Screenings: 1% of Older 
Adults 0.40 1,180 472 
School Health   
Public School Audits 2.50 230 575 
Private and Preschool 2.50 191 478 
Annual Required Workload 
Hours  2          36,402 
 
Annual Hours Available 
per Public Health Nurse 3           1,313
 
Public Health Nurses Required to 
Complete Workload Hours (N)   28
Available Public Health Nurses 
(N)   21
 
Manpower Deficit Public Health 
Nurses (N)       7
Notes:   
1 Hours per unit is based on local health agency experience with conducting 
programs 
2As reported in Local Health Evaluation Report LHER report 
3 Available work hours formula as explained in detail in the Appendix  
 
 
Table 5.  Registered Environmental Health Specialist (REHS) Manpower 
Requirements for Practice Standards Compliance 
 










Bathing Place    
 Inspection 2 83 166 
 Re-inspection 1 22 22 
Youth Camp     
 Inspection 2 60 120 
 Re-inspection 1 15 15 
Food Establishment Surveillance    
 Inspection 2.5 3,026 7,565 
 Re-inspection 2 696 1,392 
 Complaint 2 545 1,090 
 Plan review 1 151 151 
Public Health Nuisance    
 Complaint 1 5,566 5,566 
 Investigation 1 5,984 5,984 
Childhood Lead Poisoning    
 Risk assessments 2 466 932 
 Residences abated 8 40 320 
Rabies and Zoonosis Control 2    
 Animal bite investigations 1 1,280 1,280 
 Pet shop inspection 2 9 18 
Other     
 Schools and Institutions 2.5 230 575 
 Court/Enforcement action 3 541 1,623 
 
Annual Required Workload Hours      26,819 
 
Annual Hours Available3 
per REHS   1,313 
 
REHS’s Required to Complete Workload 
Hours (N)       27 
 
Available REHS’s (N)        17 
 
Manpower Deficit REHS’s (N)      10 
Note:  
1 Hours per unit is based on local health agency experience  
2 Zoonosis:  Diseases transmitted from animals to humans 
3 Available work hours formula as explained in detail in the Appendix  
EXPECTATIONS OF PUBLIC HEALTH IN HOMELAND 
SECURITY 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security was developed in July 2002 as a foundation 
to direct local, state and federal agencies in their planning efforts for protecting the 
homeland.25  The Strategy aligns the functions of homeland security into six critical 
mission areas:  (1) intelligence and warning (2) border and transportation security (3) 
domestic counterterrorism (4) protecting critical infrastructure (5) defending against 
catastrophic terrorism and (6) emergency preparedness and response. When the strategy 
was unveiled it made clear that public health sectors are to be specifically involved with:   
• protection of the food, water and public health critical infrastructures, 
• surveillance for defending against catastrophic threats, and 
• quick and effective response with other first responders.26  
On December 17, 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
8 (HSPD 8):  National Preparedness, which establishes policies, procedures and goals 
that strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent, deter, respond to, and 
recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.  HSPD 8 
introduced the concept of all hazards preparedness which is based on the existence of 
plans, procedures, policies, training, and equipment to maximize the effectiveness of a 
multi discipline response effort in the event of any type of emergency.27   
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Act of 2002 allocated close to $1 
billion to improve state and local public health capabilities.28  CDC used the money to 
establish a Public Health Emergency Preparedness “Cooperative Agreements” to aid state 
and local governments in their efforts of bioterrorism preparedness and planning.  As of 
2005, the all hazards approach stressing nine preparedness goals was adopted in the 
Cooperative Agreements.  The preparedness goals align program activities, tasks, and 
deliverables with Homeland Security’s mission to prevent, protect, respond and recover 
from an event whether manmade or natural disaster.  The goals are designed to measure 
public health system response parameters.29  The CDC Preparedness Goals are:   
 
Prevent:  (1) Increase the use and development of interventions known to 
prevent human illness from chemical, biological, radiological agents, 
and naturally occurring health threats.  
(2) Decrease the time needed to classify health events as terrorism or 
naturally occurring in partnership with other agencies. 
Detect/Report:  (3) Decrease the time needed to detect and report chemical, biological, 
radiological agents in tissue, food or environmental samples that cause 
threats to the public’s health.  
(4) Improve the timeliness and accuracy of information regarding 
threats to the public’s health as reported by clinicians and through 
electronic early event detection, in real time, to those who need to 
know. 
Investigate:  (5) Decrease the time to identify causes, risk factors, and appropriate 
interventions for those affected by threats to the public’s health. 
Control:  (6) Decrease the time needed to provide countermeasures and health 
guidance to those affected by threats to the public’s health. 
Recover:  (7) Decrease the time needed to restore health services and 
environmental safety to pre-event levels.  
(8) Increase the long-term follow-up provided to those affected by 
threats to the public’s health. 
Improve:  (9) Decrease the time needed to implement recommendations from 
after-action reports following threats to the public’s health. 30 
 
The Local Core Capacity Infrastructure for Bioterrorism Grant aka Attachment C 
is the New Jersey version of the CDC Preparedness Goal Grant with very few changes 
except for additional reporting requirements. The core LINCS staff in Union County is 
tasked with ensuring that the preparedness goals are met in accordance with the 
expectations of the NJDHSS.   
There are many grant reporting requirements that are required on a quarterly 
basis.  In addition to the general reporting requirements, there are additional reporting 
requirements required by the NJDHSS.  A conservative estimate of the “reporting-only” 
manpower drain is one full time equivalent.  Almost 20% of the county’s preparedness 
effort is devoted to satisfying NJDHSS over-sight.  This reporting time is not accounted 
for in these manpower estimates to ensure that we use the most conservative approach. 
Table 6 details the time estimate, evaluated by each core position, needed to 
complete each of Preparedness Goals and over 78 required critical tasks in the 
Bioterrorism Preparedness Grant. To obtain these estimates, the Local Core Capacity 
Infrastructure for Bioterrorism Preparedness grant was reviewed by each core position 
and critical task.  An estimate of time to complete each function per position was 
determined for each task.  Total hours per position were divided by available hours 
(1,313) to determine the full time equivalent.  Registered environmental health specialists 
do not have any specific additional duties associated with bioterrorism preparedness.  
Since most tasks require local health agency cooperation, a local time estimate was 
included, but is not specifically assigned to any of the four positions.  A LINCs 
coordinator role was included in this analysis.  The grant funds one epidemiologist, one 
public health nurse, one LINCS coordinator and one health education/risk 
communication specialist (HERC) (as well as a state planner, one health officer, and an 
information technology specialist).  Table 6 shows that given the workload requirements, 
the grant funded positions are not adequate, needing one more epidemiologist, one more 
HERC, and one more LINCs coordinator.  Not only is there a shortfall in the funded 
positions but there is a significant need in the area of LHA involvement. Successful 
completion of each of the grant’s critical tasks requires a significant local commitment 
and substantial cooperation that will require an influx of three FTE’s at the local level.   
 













1. A.  All Hazards 
Planning 884 109 109 109 109 
2. A.  Information 
Collection/ Threat 
Recognition 40 364 7 388 364 
2. B.  Hazard 
Vulnerability Analysis 20 0 7 7 30 
4. A.  Health Intelligence 
Integration/ Analysis 385 962 234 7 982 
5. A.  Public Health 
Epidemiological 
Investigation 280 153 153 28 153 
6.A. Emergency 
Response 
Communications 0 24 24 1,113 133 
6. B.  Emergency Public 












6. C.  Worker Health 
Safety 120 72 21 7 72 
6. D.  Isolation and 
Quarantine 2,120 52 52 52 60 
6. E.  Mass 
Prophylaxis/Vaccination 70 205 205 205 331 
6. F.  Medical & Pub 
Health Surge 0 46 102 18 18 
7. A.  Economic & 
Community Recovery 0 0 0 21 84 
8.  Recover 0 32 4 14 32 
 
Total Hours (Annual) 3,949 2,083 947 2,016 2,530 
Manpower Needed (N)4        3 2 1 2 2 
Current Staff (N)              0 1 1 1 1 
Total  Deficit                     3 1 0 1 1 
Notes:   
1 Local Information Network Communication System 
2 Health Education/Risk Communications 
3 Not specified to one of the four positions 
4 Number’s are rounded to nearest whole number 
5  Goal 3 (detect) & 9 (improve) were intentionally left out. Goal 3 has no critical tasks 
assigned to this area.  It is related to laboratory testing and the state department of health 
is responsible for this area. Goal 9 does not have any immediate impact on manpower 
requirements until recommendations from an incident are made. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The mantras of “all hazard preparedness” and “dual use functionality” can not overcome 
the basic problem of insufficient manpower.  All hazards preparedness begins by 
strengthening the response elements that are common to a spectrum of emergency 
situations.  Training and equipping an inadequate workforce does little to improve 
preparedness.   Dual use functionality assumes that there were sufficient resources for 
“single” use. 
Table 7 is a summary of the total manpower deficit for public health professionals 
in Union County, NJ.  To be in compliance with NJ practice standards and conform to the 
bioterrorism preparedness goals, 29 additional staff members must be added to the public 
health workforce.  This is a very conservative estimate since we restricted the service 
population to those living at or below the 200% poverty line. At its most optimistic, 
Union County is currently staffed at 68% of the needed workforce level.   
 
Table 7.  Summary of Manpower Requirements for Compliance with Practice 














Epidemiology 3,867 2,083 5 1 4 
Health Education/Risk 
Communication 6,155 2,530 7 3 4 
Public Health Nurse 36,402 947 29 22 7 
 
Registered Environmental 
Health Specialist 26,819 … 27 17 10 
 
LHA2 Support for 
Bioterrorism Grant   
(unspecified labor category) … 3,949 3 0 3 
LINCS Coordinator … 2,016 2 1 1 
Total         73          44  29  
Note: 
1 BT: Bioterrorism 
2 LHA:  Local Health Agency 
 
 
Klitzman and Freudenberg suggested that a standing workforce with not only the 
capacity to provide recognized health services but a reserve capacity was needed to 
effectively meet the challenges of a large scale emergency. 31  Clearly there are not 
enough funded positions to even provide the absolute minimum level of services required 
by the NJDHSS.  In the 2004 edition of America’s Health: State Health Rankings; A Call 
to Action for People and Their Communities, New Jersey ranked a dismal 41st out of 50 
in per capita spending on public health.32  As if this ranking wasn’t bad enough, between 
2003 and 2004, New Jersey witnessed an 11% decrease in the public health budget.33 In 
2004, NJ fell to 48th decreasing spending from $32 to $14 per person.34   Public health 
will have a more difficult time meeting New Jersey mandated bioterrorism efforts and 
traditional health services at the local level as the state 2006 budget is posted with an 
expected decrease of 13.2%.35  To close the manpower gap in Union County, in addition 
to not having a budget cut, an additional, sustained $3 million per year needs to be added 
to the public health budget to fund and equip an additional 29 full time employees. 
This study has shown that the Union County New Jersey’s Public Health 
infrastructure is inadequate from a manpower standpoint to fulfill either state/ federal 
health objectives or bio preparedness functions.  National studies indicate that Union 
County is not unique in this position.  
The role of public health in responding to natural and man-made disasters is an 
important Homeland Security issue.  Even the tasks associated with traditional public 
health play a central role in accomplishing the Homeland Security mission.  Public 
Health prevention concepts and personnel are essential to control infection spread, reduce 
vulnerabilities, minimize damages and aid recovery from a biological emergency.  If 
public health is to become the “indispensable pillar of our national security framework”36 
that has been called for, then it will require not only political support but increased 
funding and additional manpower.  If governments are serious about including public 
health in the homeland security mission of preventing, protecting, responding, and 
recovering from major events or threats, then the identified shortages must be rectified in 
every jurisdiction across the country.  Public health resources need to be aligned with the 
new planning goals. 
 The Strategy for Homeland Security stresses the need for a robust public health 
component to respond to and recover from a range of emergencies from the biological 
dangers posed by an influenza pandemic to the use of toxic agents in a terrorist attack.  
This Strategy relies on the same infrastructure that has proven incapable of meeting US 
Department of Health and Human Services National Health objectives.  If it is to be truly 
effective the national strategy must be based upon the actual, rather than the expected, 
capabilities of the weakest unit in the region of highest risk or vulnerability. 
It is imperative that the capacity of the public health manpower infrastructure is 
increased as a Homeland Security priority.  If manpower infrastructure capacity is not the 
first step in public health preparedness, each succeeding step will be addressed by 
robbing resources from other mandated programs.  Trade-offs between mandated 
programs will be necessary as it will not be possible to support all programs, revealing a 
tug-of-war of daily priorities without concern for actual service levels on any program. 
Investments in manpower capacity should be targeted according to population based 
health objectives if we are to maximize the dual domestic preparedness / public health 
uses.  Federal and state spending priorities need to be re-aligned for public health to 
become a partner in the mission of Homeland Security.  This study argues that that the 
goal of sustainable funding for public health begins with an accurate measure of the 
capacities of the system in relation to demands placed upon it. Without such a measure 
public health will continue to fail in its primary functions and lack the capacity to meet 
Homeland Security goals.   
Appendix: Formula for Estimating Core Public Health Personnel Availability in 
Hours per Year  
 
Step 1.  Determine total man-hours per year 
 35 work hours per week * 52 weeks = 1,820 total annual work hours 
 
Step 2.  Determine total man-hours per year expected to be absent 









Vacation 7 12 84 
Holidays 7 13 91 
Sick 7 7 49 
Personal 7 2 14 
Training 7 7 49 
Expected 
time off due 
to absences 
   
287 
 
Step 3.  Calculate total (net) available work hours 
 1,820 total annual work hours – 287 expected time-off hours  
= 1,533 total available work hours 
 
Step 4.  Determine travel and office time 
  







1.5 5 44 = 330 
Office Hours b Days   
 Office time 
(Hours) 
1 5 44 = 220 
Travel time  + Office time  = 550 
 









Epidemiology c 1,533 -220 1,313 
HERC c 1,533 -220 1,313 
Public Health Nurse c 1,533 -220 1,313 
REHS 2, a 1,533 -550 983 
 
 
Step 6.  Determine annual workload hours for each core position in LHAd by multiplying 
the hourly average of each activity by the target number of activities per year 
 
Step 7. Determine the number of core positions neededd by dividing Step 6 by Step 5 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes:   
a Travel time is only considered for REHS. 
b Defined as office coverage, filing, research etc. 
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